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RECENT CASES
drafting will not guarantee absolute protection from the increased







Crim v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co.'
Crim v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co. indicates continuing
ambivalence in Missouri's approach for determining ambiguity in in-
surance contracts. More pointedly, it suggests that an advocate who fails to
recognize judicial uncertainty in this area may mistakenly base his case on
a theory which the court finds irrelevant.
In 1975 plaintiff's right eye was severely injured in an accident. At the
time, he was covered by a life, health, and accident policy issued by defen-
dant insurance company. Under the policy, coverage included payment
for accidental bodily injuries resulting in the loss of sight of one eye. "With
respect to eyes," the policy specified, "'loss' means the entire and ir-
recoverable loss of sight." 2
Before the accident, vision in plaintiff's eye was normal. Afterwards,
maximum surgery and medical treatments restored unaided visual acuity
to 2/200, i.e., plaintiff must now move within two feet to see what is nor-
mally recognizable at 200 feet, and depth perception was completely ab-
sent. There was scant denial that plaintiff's loss of sight was "entire" under
the terms of the policy.3 Nonetheless, defendant withheld benefits. Even if
1. 605 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. En Banc 1980).
2. Id. at 74.
3. Without elaboration, the court declared, " 'Entire [...] loss' is not in
issue," and so affirmed the trial court's finding that the phrase "entire loss of
sight" does not restrict coverage to cases where no eyesight remains. Id. at 75.
Although no authority was cited, the court relied apparently on Mulcahey v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 229 Mo. App. 610, 79 S.W.2d 759 (K.C. 1934),
cited by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District in its opinion on
the case. Crim v. National Life & Accid. Ins. Co., No. 30147, slip op. at 3 (Mo.
App., W.D. Oct. 29, 1979). See note 7 infra. In Mulcahey, the court found that
19811
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the loss was "entire," claimed defendant, it was not "irrecoverable," since
a corrective contact lens improved vision in plaintiff's eye to a near-normal
20/25.
Plaintiff argued, to the contrary, that the natural, unaided vision in
his eye was irrecoverably lost. Since an artificial aid is not the same as one's
"God-given faculties," corrected sight is not recovered sight. 4 At the very
least, he emphasized, the policy language is reasonably susceptible of both
interpretations. A policy term which is reasonably susceptible of two in-
terpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured.6
the insured had failed to demonstrate "complete and permanent loss of...
sight," 229 Mo. App. at 611, 79 S.W.2d at 760, but added:
This does not mean that plaintiff cannot recover by the mere showing of
retention of light perception, that is, the ability to distinguish daylight
from dark, but there is no liability under the policy so long as plaintiff
has the ability to see and recognize objects, and the retention of enough
sight to be of some practical and useful benefit to him in connection with
his needs and pleasures in everyday life.
Id. at 621, 79 S.W.2d at 765.
Therefore, the Crim decision establishes that a reduction in visual acuity
from 20/20 to 2/200 combined with a complete loss of depth perception qualifies
in Missouri as the "entire loss of sight." 605 S.W.2d at 74-75.
4. Brief of Respondent at 6-7.
5. Id. at 11.
6. Decisions applying the rule that ambiguous insurance language must be
construed in favor of the insured are legion. For a partial list, see 13J. APPLEMAN
&J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7401 (1976 & Supp. 1980); 43
AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 271 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1980); 44 C.J.S. Insurance §
297 (1945 & Cum. Supp. 1980). Most likely, the rule is an adaption of the con-
tract maxim omnia praesumuntur contra proferentem, which specifies that if a
written contract contains a word or phrase which is susceptible of two reasonable
meanings, the preferred interpretation will be that which is less favorable to the
one who drafted the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 232
(Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 854 (1964). This maxim favors the party of
lesser bargaining power who had little or no opportunity to choose the terms of
the contract, but has not been limited exclusively to such cases. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 232, Comment a (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); Pat-
terson, supra, at 854.
It follows from contra proferentem that the rule requiring construction of
ambiguous insurance terms in favor of the insured has no application where the
policy has been prepared by the insured. 13J. APPLEMAN &J. APPLEMAN, supra,
§ 7402, at 300. Similarly, the rule has been applied sparingly when relative parity
of bargaining positions existed between the parties, e.g., when the form of con-
tract was insisted upon by the insured, when the contract was prepared by the in-
sured's broker or by representatives of both parties, and when the parties to the
contract were both large corporations. Id. § 7402, at 300-01. Where the plaintiff
is a third person who was not a party to the insurance contract, the principle has
also been held inapplicable. Id. § 7402, at 51 (Supp. 1980).
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The trial court agreed with plaintiff and entered judgment in his
behalf.7 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that since suffici-
ent vision was restored to plaintiff by the contact lens, he had not sustained
"'irrecoverable loss of sight' of his right eye within the clear and unam-
biguous terms of the policy." 8
The impact of the holding in this case will be relatively minor. Most
likely, it will be restricted to similar claims arising from the same or
substantively identical policy language. The method used by the court to
reach its conclusion, however, is another matter. Insofar as it reveals
judicial uncertainty as to the proper approach for interpreting insurance
contracts, the case may well be relevant to every insurance dispute where
ambiguity is an issue.
Dubiety in this area stems from application of two well-worn principles
of insurance law: unequivocal language must be given its plain meaning
though found in an insurance contract, 9 and, if policy language is
reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the ambiguity
must be resolved in favor of the insured.10 These precepts are often termed
"well-settled," but in practice their application is far from uniform. 1 Over
the years, two general approaches have emerged: the plain meaning ap-
proach and the reasonable interpretations approach.
7. Grim was tried in the Circuit Court for Johnson County, Missouri. After
judgment for plaintiff, the case was appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District. In a 4-3 decision, the court of appeals affirmed, Crim v. Na-
tional Life & Accid. Ins. Co., No. 30147 (Mo. App., W.D. Oct. 29, 1979), but
transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court for final determination.
8. 605 S.W.2d at 77. Clearly, the court in Grim held that lost sight is not
"irrecoverable" to the extent it can be corrected by artificial lenses. Interestingly,
however, the court's introductory declaration that" '[e]ntire [ ... ] loss' is not an
issue ... [in this case]," id. at 75, indicates that loss of sight may be "entire,"
without regard to whether it is correctible by artificial lenses. See note 3 supra. In-
deed, the majority opinion does not preclude an argument that loss of practical
and useful sight, even for an instant and without regard to whether it is correcti-
ble by any means, qualifies as the "entire" loss of sight.
9. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Mo.
1960).
10. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 522
S.W.2d 809, 817 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
11. See cases cited notes 17, 47-49 infra. The uneven application of these
principles may reflect the more general controversy among contract scholars
regarding the correct approach to interpreting integrated agreements.
In the view of Professor Williston, terms in integrated agreements should be
accorded the meaning which would be accorded by a reasonable man in the posi-
tion of the parties. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
610, at 511 (3d ed. 1961).
According to Professor Corbin, however, the primary function of the court in
contract disputes is to determine the intention and understanding of the parties. 3
1981] 449
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Under the plain meaning approach the words "plain" and "unam-
biguous" are virtually synonymous. A court following this approach will
state the rules of construction somewhat as follows: "When the language of
a contract is plain 2 and its meaning unmistakable, there is no ambiguity
and no room for construction .... The court can only construe when the
contract is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions."13
Judicial attention under this approach focuses first on determining
whether the language in issue has a plain meaning. Most relevant to the
court are such questions as whether on its face the language seems to have
a plain meaning, whether other courts have determined the language to be
plain, and whether the dictionary supports a view that the meaning is
plain. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, further inquiry is
unnecessary. 14
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 538 (1960). If they coincide, there is a contract. If they
do not coincide, there is no agreement on the term in dispute unless one party
knew or had reason to know of the meaning attached by the other. Id.
In practice, emphasis by courts following the Williston approach may well be
on ascertaining the plain and ordinary meaning of a term, i.e., that meaning
which would be understood by a reasonable person in the position of the parties.
Courts following the Corbin approach, on the other hand, are more likely to em-
phasize an analysis of each asserted meaning to ascertain if it was the meaning ac-
tually intended by either or both of the parties.
12. When the court in an insurance case declares that a term has a plain
meaning it does not assert that the meaning of the term can never be indistinct.
Rather, the court means that the meaning of the term plainly includes or ex-
cludes coverage for a particular event. This distinction was illustrated in State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1960), where plaintiff
unsuccessfully argued that because the meaning of a term might be indistinct in
other contexts, it was ambiguous and should be construed in his favor. Id. at 639.
Occasionally, courts blur the distinction between unambiguous meaning (not in
issue) and unambiguous coverage (in issue). See Winterton v. Van Zandt, 351
S.W.2d 696, 700 (Mo. 1961), and Adams v. Covenant Security Ins. Co., 465
S.W.2d 32, 34 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971), in which the courts found that even
though language had an unambiguous meaning, the meaning was sufficiently
flexible to permit construction in favor of the insured. What these courts meant
was that although there was a seemingly plain dictionary definition, its ap-
plicability to a particular event was uncertain. The fact that Adams and Winter.
ton were cited by the majority in Crim, 605 S.W.2d at 76, indicates that this court
too may have lost sight of the distinction between "meaning" and "coverage." Use
of the term "plain coverage" would eliminate much confusion, but since "plain
meaning" is the term used by the courts, it will be used throughout this Casenote.
13. Mutual Benefit Health & Accid. Ass'n v. Hobbs, 186 F.2d 321, 323 (8th
Cir. 1951).
14. In cases where the court can find that the meaning of a term plainly in-
cludes or excludes coverage for the event in question, the plain meaning ap-
proach bears a striking resemblance to the approach advocated by Professor
[Vol. 46
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A court using the reasonable interpretations approach concedes that
plain and unambiguous language in an insurance contract must be given
its ordinary meaning and effect, but stresses that ambiguity exists when
the language used is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpreta-
tion.15 Under this approach, the reasonableness of the insured's inter-
pretation is the focus of judicial attention. Most relevant to the court are
such considerations as whether the insured's interpretation seems reason-
able and the extent to which other courts have acknowledged its reason-
ableness. If the results of this analysis are positive, the language can be
considered ambiguous and construed in favor of the insured. 16
Williston. See note 11 supra. In cases where the court is unable to find clear
coverage or exclusion, the likeness seems to end.
Under Williston's theory, when the court is unable to determine the meaning
which would have been understood by a reasonable man in the position of the
parties, the language is ambiguous. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 609. In
such event, the following rules apply: (A) where neither party knows or has reason
to know of the ambiguity or where both parties have reason to know of the am-
biguity it is given the meaning that each party intended it to bear. As a practical
matter, this means that if the parties gave the ambiguous expression the same
meaning there was agreement, but if they gave it a different meaning there was
none; (B) where one party knows or has reason to know of the ambiguity and the
other does not, it bears the meaning given to it by the latter. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-10, at 119 (2d ed. 1977).
In Missouri insurance cases, there is no overt consideration of the notion of
fault. Once it is determined that language has no plain meaning, it is labeled
uncertain or ambiguous and construed in favor of the insured. See, e.g., Boling v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Mo. 1971). See note 16 in-
fra.
The plain meaning approach is not entirely inconsistent with the approach
advocated by Professor Corbin. In the absence of extrinsic evidence to the con-
trary, a court using Corbin's approach may find the meaning of a term so plain
and the interpretation now asserted by one of the parties so unreasonable that it
concludes both parties intended the plain meaning of the term. 3 A. CORBIN,
supra note 11, § 539, at 82.
To Williston, the finding of a plain meaning can end the inquiry. To Corbin,
on the other hand, plain meaning is only evidence of the intent of the parties. To
the extent it stifles inquiry beyond the plain meaning of a term, the plain mean-
ing approach would be an anathema to him.
15. E.g., Kyte v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 549 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1977).
16. The reasonable interpretations approach is consistent with the ap-
proach advocated by Professor Corbin. Under both, the content and reasonable-
ness of each party's interpretation must be evaluated. Under both, a court may
find the construction now asserted by one of the parties that both parties intended
the reasonable construction of the term. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 539, at
82.
According to Corbin, however, once it is determined that one party intended
to purchase different coverage than the other party intended to provide, the
1981]
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The difference between the plain meaning approach and the reason-
able interpretations approach is really one of emphasis. Under the former,
a term which has a plain and unambiguous meaning is not reasonably
susceptible of more than one interpretation; under the latter, a term
which is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations does not have a plain
and unambiguous meaning.
In recent years the reasonable interpretations approach has received
increasing approval among Missouri's courts of appeals.17 Crim indicates,
however, that the party who relies solely on this approach may do so at
grave peril.
agreement fails unless one party knew or had reason to know of the purpose of the
other party. If one party knew or had reason to know of the purpose of the other
party, the language is accorded the meaning understood by the party without
fault.
In Missouri insurance cases, there is no overt consideration of the notion of
fault. Once it is determined that the language in question is reasonably suscept-
ible of more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and construed in favor of the
insured. E.g., Kyte v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 549 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1977).
It may be that the courts in these cases accept impliedly the fiction that in-
surance companies have reason to know all reasonable meanings which may be
attached to their language and, conversely, that most insureds have no reason to
know the meaning, no matter how reasonable, intended by the insurer. Most like-
ly, however, the reasonable interpretations approach is an outgrowth of Corbin's
recognition that there may be cases in which all efforts to ascertain the intent of
the parties fail. Insurance cases may be particularly appropriate for this classifi-
cation because most often the insured himself doesn't know the specific nature of
the protection he intended to buy. According to Corbin, after all efforts to ascer-
tain the intent of the parties fail and two possible and reasonable interpretations
remain, the rule of interpreting language against the draftsman may be applied.
3 A. CORBIN, supra, § 559, at 262.
17. See generally Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 570
S.W.2d 691 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978); Kyte v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 549
S.W.2d 366 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977); Kay v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548
S.W.2d 629 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Bennett v. American Life & Accid. Ins.
Co., 495 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. App., St. L. 1973); Reese v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins.
Co., 457 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. App., St. L. 1970); White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497
(Mo. App., Spr. 1969); 95 West Corp. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 424
S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967); Union Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 422
S.W.2d 87 (Mo. App., St. L. 1967); Morris v. Western Gas. & Sur. Co., 421
S.W.2d 19 (Mo. App., Spr. 1967); Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 385
S.W.2d 661 (Mo. App., Spr. 1965); North Kansas City Memorial Hosp. v. Wiley,
385 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. App., K.C. 1964); Irelan v. Standard Mut. Ass'n, 379
S.W.2d 815 (Mo. App., Spr. 1964); Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S:W.2d 626
(Mo. App., K.C. 1963); Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606
(Mo. App., K.C. 1963). But see Jordon v. United Equit. Life Ins. Co., 486
S.W.2d 664 (Mo. App., St. L. 1972); Eaglestein v. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 377
S.W.2d 540 (Mo. App., K.C. 1964).
[Vol. 46452
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Although the rules of construction applied in this case are nowhere set
forth, the majority opinion indicates adherence to the plain meaning ap-
proach. Most indicative is its treatment of the authorities. Four cases were
cited in support of plaintiff's interpretation of the policy language."'
Three were dismissed on technical grounds. 1 9 Completely unmentioned by
the court in its review of these cases was the endorsement in each of plain-
tiff's reasoning in the present case.20 In all three cases the courts deemed it
reasonable to believe that references to "sight" in insurance policies do not
mean artificially assisted sight. These findings need not have been adopted
by the court in Crim, but there is a quantum leap between disapproving a
decision and finding it irrelevant. The peremptory dismissal of the cases
suggests strongly that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's interpretation
was not the predominant majority concern. Further analysis confirms this
suspicion.
In Knuckles v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that the language "total and irrecoverable loss of sight" was
ambiguous as it applied to eyesight improved by artificial lenses. 2
Without ceremony, the majority in Crim pilloried this decision as "un-
sound and unsupported by authority."2 2 Two reasons were given for the
18. Winegardenv. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Benson v. Grand Lodge of the Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 54 S.W.
132 (Tenn. Ch. App.), affd orally, 54 S.W. 132 (Tenn. 1899); Boone v. United
Founders Life Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Knuckles v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 25 Utah 2d 319, 480 P.2d 745 (1971).
19. Winegarden was labeled unconvincing, because in that case two policies
covering loss of sight were considered, and the court took no particular notice of
the words "irrecoverable loss of sight." 605 S.W.2d at 77. Benson was disregarded
because the language interpreted was not the same as that in Crim. Id. at 76-77.
Boone was cited but not discussed. Id. at 76.
20. Winegarden entailed consideration of two policies. One included
coverage for "permanent loss of sight," and the other covered "entire and ir-
recoverable loss of sight." 363 So. 2d at 1172. Because neither policy indicated
whether loss of vision meant loss of actual vision or loss of corrected vision, the
court concluded both policies were ambiguous. Id. at 1173. In Benson, the in-
sured was entitled to benefits if he became "totally blind." 54 S.W. at 134. When
it was argued that payment could be denied if the insured's vision was improved
by artificial lenses, the court replied: "To hold that the parties have in con-
templation the use of lenses would be to add to the contract a term that isn't in it."
Id. at 136. Finally, although Boone dealt with the recoverability of sight through
corneal transplant, the court therein expressed approval of the opinion in
Knuckles v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 25 Utah 2d 319, 480 P.2d 745 (1971), in-
terpreting similar policy language: " 'It would seem that it would not be unrea-
sonable to conclude that the purpose of the insurance was to compensate for a
hand or a foot or a sight once lost, albeit the sight, like the hand, artificially may
be made serviceable.' " 565 S.W.2d at 382-83 (quoting Knuckles, 25 Utah 2d at
322, 480 P.2d at 747) (emphasis added in Boone).
21. 25 Utah 2d 319, 323, 480 P.2d 745, 748 (1971).
22. 605 S.W.2d at 77.
1981] 453
7
Campbell: Campbell: Insurance Contracts: Diverse Judicial Approaches
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
court's scorn. First, the Knuckles court claimed a split of authority but
cited no case in which the identical language was declared ambiguous,23
and second, the decision relied on workmen's compensation cases which
the Missouri court considered inapplicable to private insurance liti-
gation. 24 Nowhere in the court's review was the reasoning advanced in
Knuckles, i.e., the purpose of the insurance was to compensate for sight
once lost, albeit the sight artificially may be made serviceable,25 described
or evaluated. The court focused solely on undermining the authorities sup-
porting the Knuckles conclusion.
On the other side, four cases were cited as having found the language
"entire and irrecoverable loss of sight," or its equivalent, clear and unam-
biguous. Two of these cases, Home Life Insurance Co. v. Stewart26 and
Wallace v. Insurance Co. of North America,27 were precisely in point. The
other two, however, were entirely irrelevant to plaintiff's interpretation of
the policy language.
In Equitable Lfe Assurance Society of the United States v. Short,28 the
Indiana Court of Appeals was concerned with the ambiguity of "total and
irrecoverable loss of sight" as it related to restoration of sight through
surgery. The plaintiff in Crim, however, posited a substantive distinction
between medical treatment, including surgery, and artificial lenses, i.e.,
vision of one's natural eye might be recovered through the former but not
through the latter. Although the possibility of recovery through artificial
lenses was not an issue in Short, the case was quoted by the court in Crim
for its determination that the word "irrecoverable" is not ambiguous. 29
In Smith v. Great American Life Insurance Co., the Georgia Court of
Appeals concluded that the insured, who had uncorrected vision in a
range of 20/200 to 20/300 and corrected vision of 20/40 to 20/60, had not
suffered "irrecoverable loss of the entire sight."30 This decision, however,
was based on an earlier Georgia Supreme Court decision, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Sewell,3 1 which limited coverage
under the term "entire and irrecoverable loss of sight" to cases where "no
eyesight remains."3 2 Since the plaintiff in Smith did not suffer "entire" loss
23. Id. at 76.
24. Id. at 77.
25. 25 Utah 2d at 322, 480 P.2d at 747.
26. 114 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1940).
27. 415 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1969).
28. 165 Ind. App. 338, 332 N.E.2d 273 (1975).
29. 605 S.W.2d at 75 (quoting Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 165 Ind. App. at 344, 332 N.E.2d at 277). Citation of this case may also
indicate a failure by the court to distinguish between unambiguous meaning and
unambiguous coverage. See note 12 supra.
30. 125 Ga. App. 587, 588, 188 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1972).
31. 223 Ga. 31, 153 S.E.2d 432 (1967).
32. Id. at 32, 153 S.E.2d at 433.
[Vol. 46454
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of sight under the Sewell test, there is no indication the possibility of
"recovery" through glasses was a factor in the court's decision.
After quoting Stewart and Short, and citing Smith and Wallace, the
majority in Crim declared:
The logic of the holdings that vision which has been restored
by the use of artificial lenses has not been irrecoverably lost is com-
pelling. It is common knowledge such devices are frequently
employed in order to avoid loss of sight.. To say that one whose
sight has been so restored has lost his sight ignores reality.
33
Once again, the court failed to address plaintiff's contention. Plaintiff
did not argue that one whose sight has been restored by artificial lenses has
lost his sight. He maintained only that sight achieved through artificial
lenses was not the sight he had lost.
3 4
The court continued, reasoning that the word "irrecoverable" is not
made ambiguous by the fact that recovery of sight may come about in
several ways: naturally, through surgical and medical treatment, and by
artificial means.3 5 In other words, the majority assumed recovery can be
achieved by artificial means without considering whether it is reasonable
to believe otherwise.
Finally, the court's coup de grace:
The term "irrecoverable loss of sight" has a plain, easily under-
stood meaning. Webster's Third New International Dictionary de-
fines "irrecoverable" as "not capable of being recovered, regained,
remedied or rectified." The synonymous cross reference is:
"IRREPARABLE." 3 6
Like the court's previous discussion, this definition does little to con-
tradict plaintiff's interpretation of the policy language. The Webster defi-
nition indicates "irrecoverable" may, on occasion, be used inter-
changeably with several terms. This does not mean that in every context
the word "irrecoverable" is synonymous with all the terms listed. "Ap-
parently, the shipwreck is irrecoverable," is not the same as, "Apparently,
the shipwreck is irreparable," or ".. . is not capable of being remedied." It
may in fact be that this "plain, easily understood meaning" is quite consis-
tent with plaintiff's interpretation. To the extent that the natural, unaid-
ed sight of plaintiff's right eye was lost and not capable of being regained,
it was "irrecoverable." In other words, artificially corrected sight may be a
substitute for but is not a recovery of natural, unaided sight.
Again, the court might well have evaluated this argument and found it
unreasonable. As it happened, however, plaintiff's interpretation of the
policy language was never juxtaposed with its "plain, easily understood
33. 605 S.W.2d at 76.
34. Brief of Respondent at 6-7.
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meaning." Indeed, the discovery of a plain meaning seemed to extinguish
any need to inquire further.
Examination of the majority opinion seems to reveal a classic applica-
tion of the plain meaning approach. Without evaluating the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's interpretation of "irrecoverable loss of sight," the
court was able to find a clear and unambiguous meaning which compelled
a finding in favor of the defendant. S7
Three members of the court entered a terse, yet strident, dissent. 8
"Each of the opposing constructions placed by the parties upon the word
'irrecoverable' is reasonable.... Inasmuch as the term is reasonably cap-
able of being understood in either of two possible senses, it is
ambiguous."3 9 Clearly, the minority advocated a difference in approach as
well as result. In the dissenters' view, a determination of ambiguity is the
product of an appraisal of the reasonableness of each party's interpreta-
tion.
Ancillary to this argument, the minority posited that the very existence
of different court rulings concerning a term in an insurance policy in-
dicates strongly the existence of ambiguity. 40 Although this principle of in-
surance construction41 has, apparently, never been adopted by the
Missouri Supreme Court, it received approval from the Kansas City Court
of Appeals as early as 1915.42 In 1958 the Springfield Court of Appeals
opined that judicial conflict on the meaning of a word is itself indicative
that the word as so used is susceptible to more than one reasonable inter-
pretation. 43
The majority opinion in Crim seems to preclude adoption of this prin-
37. Id. at 77..
38. Id. at 78 (Rendlen, J., dissenting). There were two dissenting opinions
in this case. Three judges concurred in the dissent cited above. Two of these
judges joined in another dissent, declaring that although there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding of ambiguity, they did not regard the policy langu-
age as ambiguous. Id. at 78 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting). The wording of the
policy convinced these judges that the insured intended to purchase and the in-
surance company intended to sell a policy which provided coverage for this in-
jury. Id. (Bardgett, CJ., dissenting). Because this opinion does not shed light on
the approach followed or advocated by members of the court in this case, it is not
discussed herein at length.
39. Id. at 79 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
41. See generally 13J. APPLEMAN &J. APPLEMAN, supra note 6, § 7404, at
334; 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:83 (2d ed. Supp. 1979);
43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 273 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
42. Schmol v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 S.W. 1108, 1111 (K.C.), rev'd on
other grounds, 266 Mo. 580, 182 S.W. 740 (En Banc 1915).
43. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47
(Mo. App., Spr. 1958).
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ciple in its most extreme form, i.e., conflicting judicial opinions compel a
finding of ambiguity. 4" Nothing in the decision, however, prohibits
recognition of conflicting judicial opinions as evidence of ambiguity, and
courts in many other states have done so. 45 One court went so far as to cite
conflicting opinions among different levels of the same court system as
evidence of ambiguity. 4"
In the last twenty years the Missouri Supreme Court's approach to
determining ambiguity in insurance contracts has been far from consis-
tent. In a few cases, the court seemingly has recognized the reasonable in-
terpretations approach. 47 In more cases, the court has seemed content to
44. "If we say that language becomes ambiguous because some one
contends it is ambiguous or some other concludes it is am-
bigous, we save ourselves much labor, but we have applied a
test that scarcely will stand examination. Unless we can point
out in language we are considering wherein it has a double
meaning, we are not justified in saying it is ambiguous, however
many learned judges and unlearned laymen have voted 'yes'
upon the question, 'Is it ambiguous?' "
605 S.W.2d at 77 (quoting Orr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 F.2d 901, 903 (W.D.
Mo. 1932), affd, 64 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1933)).
45. Like Missouri, Alabama and Oregon have expressly rejected the notion
that conflicting judicial opinions compel a finding of ambiguity. Trinity Univer-
sal Ins. Co. v. Robert P. Stapp, Inc., 278 Ala. 209, 212, 177 So. 2d 102, 105
(1963); I-L Logging Co. v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 202 Or.
277, 316-17, 275 P.2d 226, 230-31 (1954). In a number of states, conflicting
judicial opinions have been recognized as evidence of ambiguity. See Federal Ins.
Co. v. P.A.T. Homes, Inc., 113 Ariz. 136, 138, 547 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1976);
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Puryear Wood Prods. Co., 247 Ark. 673, 678,
447 S.W.2d 139, 142 (1969); Boston Ins. Co. v. Gable, 352 F.2d 368, 370 (5th
Cir. 1965) (applying Georgia law); Alliance Life Ins. Co. v. Ulysses Vol.
Fireman's Relief Ass'n, 215 Kan. 937, 948, 529 P.2d 171, 180 (1974); C &J Com-
mercial Driveway, Inc. v. Fidelity & Guar. Fire Corp., 258 Mich. 624, 629, 242
N.W. 789, 790 (1932); Walker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 899, 901
(D. Mont. 1967) (applying Montana law); Thomas v. Mutual Benefit Health &
Accid. Ass'n., 123 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (applying New York law),
affd, 220 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1955); Gould Morris Elec. Co. v. Atlantic Fire Ins.
Co., 229 N.C. 518, 521, 50 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1948); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v.
Gerwick, 50 Ohio App. 277, 281, 197 N.E. 923, 925 (1934); Jones v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 264 Or. 276, 282, 504 P.2d 130, 133 (1972); Alvis v.
Mutual Benefit Health & Accid. Ass'n, 201 Tenn. 198, 204, 297 S.W.2d 643, 645
(1956).
46. Thomas v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accid. Ass'n, 123 F. Supp. 167,171
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (applying New York law), affd, 220 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1955).
47. E.g., Moskowitz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States,
544 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Mo. En Banc 1976) ("The language is brief and precise....
There is no room for any other reasonable interpretation of the language used.");
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Haas, 422 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Mo. 1968) ("The clause is
uncertain as to its application, and as applied to the facts and circumstances is
1981]
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determine whether the language has a plain, clear, certain, or unam-
biguous meaning without indicating how it reached this conclusion. 4 1 In
several instances, the court has recited both principles without amplifica-
tion as to where the emphasis should lie,49 and on one particularly creative
occasion the court found that, although the language was ambiguous, it
also had a plain meaning. 50 These opinions suggest that the court itself
may be irresolute about the proper approach to apply.
For the most part, this ambivalence makes little practical difference.
If a court feels the interpretation proffered by either party is clearly unrea-
sonable, or the interpretation asserted by the insured is more reasonable
than that of the insurer, or that both interpretations are equally
reasonable, its decision will be the same regardless of approach. 51 In a
susceptible of more than one interpretation."); MeyerJewelry Co. v. General Ins.
Co. of America, 422 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Mo. 1968) ("We follow a construction
favorable to the insured wherever the language of a policy is. susceptible of two
meanings, one favorable to the insured, the other to the insurer.").
48. E.g., Swift & Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Mo. 1974);
Boling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Mo. 1971)
("Since the language used is uncertain the well established rule applies that it will
be construed against the insurer."); Gossett v. Larson, 457 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Mo.
1970) ("the language of the policy is not ambiguous, but, is clear and completely
free of ambiguity"); State ex rel. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. 1968) (" 'The courts may resort to
construction.., of a contract of insurance only when the language of the con-
tract, in its ordinary meaning, is indefinite, ambiguous, or equivocal; if the
language employed is clear and unambiguous there is no occasion for construc-
tion or the exercise of a choice of interpretations.' ") (quoting 44 C.J.S. Insurance
§ 290, at 1139-40 (1945)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d
635, 639 (Mo. 1960) ("Unequivocal language is to be given its plain meaning
though found in an insurance contract.").
49. See, e.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 522
S.W.2d 809 (Mo. En Banc 1975), where the court stated:
It is true that plain language in an insurance policy is not to be used to
create an ambiguity where in the context of the use and application of a
term none exists, but it is also established beyond question that where an
insurance policy is reasonably susceptible to two or more meanings, the
ambiguity will be resolved in favor of the insured.
Id. at 817. See also Meyers v. Smith, 375 S.W.2d 9, 16-17 (Mo. 1964) ("Plain and
unambiguous language must be given its plain meaning. The contract should be
construed as a whole; but, insofar as open to different constructions, that most
favorable to the insured must be adopted."); Pierce v. Businessmen's Assurance
Co. of America, 333 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Mo. 1960) ("In construing an insurance
contract the court should give to plain and unambiguous words their plain mean-
ing; it should consider the policy as a whole and if it is open to different construc-
tions, that which is most favorable to the insured should prevail .....
50. English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Mo. 1968).
51. In these cases, there are three possible determinations: (1) the policy
language does not cover the event in question (advocated by insurer), (2) the 12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss2/7
RECENT CASES
close case, however, where the court's first impression is that the interpre-
tation offered by the insurer is more reasonable than that of the insured,
the approach followed by the court may well determine the result.
As illustrated by Crim, a court applying the plain meaning approach
can follow its first impression to a conclusion in favor of the insurer without
evaluating, or even thoroughly understanding, the interpretation of the
insured. It is quite possible, therefore, to find that policy language plainly
denies coverage even though the insured's interpretation is reasonable,
albeit perhaps seemingly less reasonable than that of the insurer. Under
the reasonable interpretations approach such an outcome is not possible.
Consideration begins with an evaluation of each party's interpretation. If
both are found reasonable, whether or not one seems more reasonable, the
language is ambiguous and necessitates a finding in favor of the insured.
The spirited dissent in Crim and widespread approval by the courts of
appeals may indicate an impetus toward unequivocal adoption of the
reasonable interpretations approach. Pending unanimity, however, the
insurance claimant who is not certain the court will immediately find his
interpretation at least as reasonable as that of the insurer had best include
in his case an argument that the reasonable interpretations approach is the
correct approach to apply.
MARIA W. CAMPBELL
policy language does cover the event in question (advocated by insured), or (3) it
is unclear whether the language covers the event in question (also advocated by
the insured due to the rule that ambigious language must be construed in his
favor).
If convinced there is only one reasonable interpretation of the policy language
(i. e., it covers or does not cover the event in question and any assertion to the con-
trary is unreasonable), all courts will find in favor of the only reasonable interpre-
tation. A plain meaning court will find the plain meaning includes or excludes
coverage, and a reasonable interpretations court will agree that language
reasonably susceptible to only one interpretation must be accorded its plain
meaning.
If convinced that the interpretation which includes coverage and the one
which does not are equally reasonable, all courts will find the language am-
biguous. A plain meaning court will be unable to find a plain meaning (i. e., plain
coverage), and the reasonable interpretations court will be compelled by the two
reasonable interpretations to make a finding of ambiguity.
As the insured's assertion for coverage becomes more reasonable vis-a-vis that
of the insurer, it becomes more likely the court will find the language unam-
biguous in his favor, but he is already assured of victory by establishing that his in-
terpretation is equally reasonable and the language, therefore, is ambiguous.
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